this reason classed by Mr. Mill as an anti-utilitarian. More recently, in a letter drawn from me by this misapprehension of Mr. Mill, and afterwards published by Professor Bain in his _Mental and Moral Science_, I have re-stated this position. Already, in an explanatory article entitled _Morals and Moral Sentiments_, published in the _Fortnightly Review_ for April, 1871, I have quoted passages from that letter; and here, considering the gravity of the assertions made by the _Quarterly_ reviewer, I hope to be excused for re-quoting them:― “Morality, properly so called—the science of right conduct—has for its object to determine _how_ and _why_ certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.” * * * * * “If it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of things far too good for men as they are, it is not less true that mere expediency does not of itself tend to establish a system of things any better than that which exists. While absolute morality owes to expediency the checks which prevent it from rushing into Utopian absurdities, expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all stimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly interested in ascertaining what is _relatively right_, it still follows that we must first consider what is _absolutely right_; since the one conception presupposes the other.”