Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
To establish the truth of a proposition postulated, by showing that
the deductions from it are true, requires that the truth of the
deductions shall be shown in some way that does not directly or
indirectly assume the truth of the proposition postulated. If, setting
out with the axioms of Euclid, we deduce the truths that “the angle
in a semi-circle is a right angle,” and that “the opposite angles of
any quadrilateral figure described in a circle, are together equal
to two right angles,” and so forth; and if, because {283} these
propositions are true, we say that the axioms are true, we are guilty
of a _petitio principii_. I do not mean simply that if these various
propositions are taken as true on the strength of the demonstrations
given, the reasoning is circular, because the demonstrations assume the
axioms; but I mean more—I mean that any supposed _experimental_ proof
of these propositions by measurement, itself assumes the axioms to be
justified. For even when the supposed experimental proof consists in
showing that some two lines demonstrated by reason to be equal, are
equal when tested in perception, the axiom that things which are equal
to the same thing are equal to one another, is taken for granted. The
equality of the two lines can be ascertained only by carrying from
the one to the other, some measure (either a moveable marked line
or the space between the points of compasses), and by assuming that
the two lines are equal to one another, because they are severally
equal to this measure. The ultimate truths of mathematics, then,
cannot be established by any experimental proof that the deductions
from them are true; since the supposed experimental proof takes them
for granted. The same thing holds of ultimate physical truths. For
the alleged _a posteriori_ proof of these truths, has a vice exactly
analogous to the vice I have just indicated. Every evidence yielded
by astronomy that the axioms called “the laws of motion” are true,
resolves itself into a fulfilled prevision that some celestial body or
bodies, will be seen in a specified place, or in specified places, in
the heavens, at some assigned time. Now the day, hour, and minute of
this verifying observation, can be fixed only on the assumption that
the Earth’s motion in its orbit and its motion round its axis, continue
undiminished. Mark, then, the parallelism. One who chose to deny that
things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,
could never have it proved to him by showing the truth of deduced
propositions; since the testing process would in {284} every case
assume that which he denied. Similarly, one who refused to admit that
motion, uninterfered with, continues in the same straight line at the
same velocity, could not have it proved to him by the fulfilment of an
astronomical prediction; because he would say that both the spectator’s
position in space, and the position of the event in time, were those
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