Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
Newton’s view may be found without seeking for it in his letters: it
is contained in the _Principia_ itself. The scholium to Corollary VI.
begins thus:―
“Hitherto I have laid down such principles as have been received by
mathematicians, and are _confirmed_ by abundance of experiments. By
the two first Laws and the two first Corollaries, Galileo discovered
that the descent of bodies observed the duplicate ratio of the time,
and that the motion of projectiles was in the curve of a parabola;
experience _agreeing_ with both,” &c.
Now as this passage precedes the deductions constituting the
_Principia_, it shows conclusively, in the first place, that Newton did
not think “the whole of the _Principia_ was the proof” of the Laws of
Motion, though the Reviewer asserts that it is. Further, by the words I
have italicised, Newton implicitly describes Galileo as having asserted
these Laws of Motion, if not as gratuitous hypotheses (which he says
they are not), then as _a priori_ intuitions. For a proposition which
is _confirmed_ by {300} experiment, and which is said to _agree_ with
experience, must have been entertained before the alleged verifications
could be reached. And as before he made his experiments on falling
bodies and projectiles, Galileo had no facts serving as an inductive
basis for the Second Law of Motion, the law could not have been arrived
at by induction.
Let me end what I have to say on this vexed question by adding
a further reason to those I have already given, for saying that
physical axioms cannot be established experimentally. The belief in
their experimental establishment rests on the tacit assumption that
experiments can be made, and conclusions drawn from them, without any
truths being postulated. It is forgotten that there is a foundation
of pre-conceptions without which the perceptions and inferences of
the physicist cannot stand—_pre-conceptions which are the products
of simpler experiences than those yielded by consciously-made
experiments_. Passing over the many which do not immediately concern
us, I will name only that which does,—the exact quantitative relation
[of proportionality] between cause and effect. It is taken by the
chemist as a truth needing no proof, that if two volumes of hydrogen
unite with one volume of oxygen to form a certain quantity of water,
four volumes of hydrogen uniting with two volumes of oxygen will
form double the quantity of water. If a cubic foot of ice at 32°
is liquefied by a specified quantity of heat, it is taken to be
unquestionable that three times the quantity of heat will liquefy three
cubic feet. And similarly with mechanical forces, the unhesitating
assumption is that if one unit of force acting in a given direction
produces a certain result, two units will produce twice the result.
Every process of measurement in a physical experiment takes this for
granted; as we see in one of the simplest of them—the process of
weighing.
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