Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
Concrete Science, made up of these five concrete sub-sciences, being
thus coherent within itself, and separated from all other science,
there comes the question—Is all other science similarly coherent within
itself? or is it traversed by some second division that is equally
decided? It is thus traversed. A statical or dynamical theorem, however
simple, has always for its subject-matter something that is conceived
as extended, and as displaying force or forces—as being a seat of
resistance, or of tension, or of both, and as capable of possessing
more or less of _vis viva_. If we examine the simplest proposition of
Statics, we see that the conception of Force must be joined with the
conception of Space, before the proposition can be framed in thought;
and if we similarly examine the simplest proposition in Dynamics,
we see that Force, Space, and Time, are its essential elements. The
amounts of the terms are indifferent; and, by reduction of its terms
beyond the limits of perception, they are applied to molecules: Molar
Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics are continuous. From questions
concerning the relative motions of two or more molecules, Molecular
Mechanics passes to changes of aggregation among many molecules, to
changes in the amounts and kinds of the motions possessed by them as
members of an aggregate, and to changes of the motions transferred
through aggregates of them, as those constituting light. {98} Daily
extending its range of interpretations, it is coming to deal even
with the components of each compound molecule on the same principles.
And the unions and disunions of such more or less compound molecules,
which constitute the phenomena of Chemistry, are also being conceived
as resultant phenomena of essentially kindred natures—the affinities
of molecules for one another, and their reactions in relation to
light, heat, and other modes of force, being regarded as consequent
on the combinations of the various mechanically-determined motions of
their various components. Without at all out-running, however, this
progress in the mechanical interpretation of molecular phenomena, it
suffices to point out that the indispensable elements in any chemical
conception are units occupying places in space, and exerting forces on
one another. This, then, is the common character of all these sciences
which we at present group under the names of Mechanics, Physics,
Chemistry. Leaving undiscussed the question whether it is possible to
conceive of force apart from extended somethings exerting it, we may
assert, as beyond dispute, that if the conception of force be expelled,
no science of Mechanics, Physics, or Chemistry remains. Made coherent,
as these sciences are, by this bond of union, it is impossible to
thrust among them any other science without breaking their continuity.
We cannot place Logic between Molar Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics.
We cannot place Mathematics between the group of propositions
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