Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 3 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 3 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
I do not mean that these axiomatic truths are cognisable by all. For
the apprehension of them, as for the apprehension of simpler axioms, a
certain mental growth and a certain mental discipline are needed. In
the _Treatise on Natural Philosophy_ by Professors Thomson and Tait
[1st ed.], {221} it is remarked that “physical axioms are axiomatic
to those only who have sufficient knowledge of the action of physical
causes to enable them to see at once their necessary truth.” Doubtless
a fact and a significant fact. A plough-boy cannot form a conception
of the axiom that action and reaction are equal and opposite. In the
first place he lacks a sufficiently generalized idea of action—has not
united into one conception pushing and pulling, the blow of a fist,
the recoil of a gun, and the attraction of a planet. Still less has he
any generalized idea of reaction. And even had he these two ideas, it
is probable that, defective in power of representation as he is, he
would fail to recognize the necessary equality. Similarly with these
_a priori_ ethical truths. If a member of that Fijian slave-tribe who
regarded themselves as food for the chiefs had suggested that there
might arrive a time when men would not eat one another, his implied
belief that men might come to have a little respect for one another’s
lives, condemned as utterly without justification in experience, would
be considered as fit only for a wild speculator. Facts furnished by
every-day observation make it clear to the Biluchi, keeping watch
in his mud-tower, that possession of property can be maintained
only by force; and it is most likely to him scarcely conceivable
that there exist limits which, if mutually recognized, may exclude
aggressions, and make it needless to mount guard over fields: only an
absurd idealist (supposing such a thing known to him) would suggest
the possibility. And so even of our own ancestors in feudal times,
it may be concluded that, constantly going about armed and often
taking refuge in strongholds, the thought of a peaceful social state
would have seemed ridiculous; and the belief that there might be
a recognized equality among men’s claims to pursue the objects of
life, and a consequent desistence from aggressions, would have been
scarcely conceivable. But now that an orderly social state has been
maintained for generations—now that in daily {222} intercourse men
rarely use violence, commonly pay what they owe, and in most cases
respect the claims of the weak as well as those of the strong—now
that they are brought up with the idea that all men are equal before
the law, and daily see judicial decisions turning upon the question
whether one citizen has or has not infringed upon the equal rights
of another; there exist in the general mind materials for forming
the conception of a _régime_ in which men’s activities are mutually
limited, and in which maintenance of harmony depends on respect for the
limits.
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