And if this undue multiplication of supplementary lines has often directly decreased the facilities of communication, still more has it done this indirectly, by maintaining the cost of travelling on the main lines. Little as the public are conscious of the fact, it is nevertheless true, that they pay for the accommodation of unremunerative districts, by high fares in remunerative districts. Before this reckless branch-making commenced, 8 and 9 per cent. were the dividends returned by our chief railways; and these dividends were rapidly increasing. The maximum dividend allowed by their Acts is 10 per cent. Had there not been unprofitable extensions, this maximum would have been reached many years since; and in the absence of the power to undertake new works, the fact that it had been reached could not have been hidden. Lower rates for goods and passengers would necessarily have followed. These would have caused much additional traffic; and with the aid of the natural increase otherwise going on, the maximum would shortly again have been reached. There can scarcely be a doubt that repetitions of this process would, before now, have reduced the fares and {99} freights on our main lines by at least one-third. This reduction, be it remembered, would have affected those railways which subserve commercial and social intercourse in the greatest degree—would, therefore, have applied to the most important part of the traffic throughout the kingdom. As it is, however, this greater proportion of the traffic has been heavily taxed for the benefit of the smaller proportion. That the tens who travel on branches might have railway communication, the hundreds who travel along main lines have been charged 30, or 40 per cent. extra. Nay, worse: that these few might be accommodated, the many who would have been brought on to the main lines by lower fares have gone unaccommodated. Is it then so clear that undertakings which have been disastrous to shareholders have yet been beneficial to the public?