That he is right in the last of these assertions I think highly probable. In face of the currently accepted dogma that an Act of Parliament can do anything, it is foolish to expect that Parliament would, by ethical considerations, be restrained from breaking contracts and authorizing the breaking of contracts. When we see this dogma habitually acted upon to the extent of trampling under foot State-guarantees (as in the case of those who purchased land under the Irish Encumbered Estates Act, or as in the case of agreements originally entered into with companies to confer on them certain powers under certain conditions) it would be absurd to suppose that any tender regard for the claims of dissentient proprietors would deter the ruling body from cancelling the understanding under which shareholders consented to co-operate. Men must be much more conscientious than they are before any such check is likely to be effective. To the other objection—that such a restriction would entail an unworkable complication—I entirely demur. That its consequences would be awkward under our present form of railway-administration may be true; but it is also true that had such a restriction been insisted on, another and better form of railway-administration would have arisen. This will probably be thought an unwarranted assertion. Nevertheless I make it with some confidence, since the form of administration to which I refer is one which was, in a different guise, contemplated when railways {110} were originally authorized. To those whose only conception of the mode of carrying on railway-traffic is that derived from their daily observations, this will be an incomprehensible statement; but those who remember how railways were originally intended to be used will know what I mean.