muscle-cell ought to differ more from that of a nerve-cell and of a digestive-cell in the same individual, than the idioplasm of the germ-cell of one individual differs from that of other individuals of the same species; and yet, according to Nägeli, the latter small difference in the effect is supposed to be due to difference of quality in the cause—the idioplasm, while the former fundamental difference in the histological differentiation of cells is supposed to follow from mere difference ‘of tension and movement.’ Nägeli’s hypothesis appears to be self-contradictory; for, although its author recognizes the truth of the fundamental law of development, and explains the stages of ontogeny as an abbreviated recapitulation of phyletic stages, he nevertheless explains the latter by a different principle from that which he employs to explain the former. According to Nägeli, the stages of phylogeny are based upon true qualitative differences in the idioplasm: the germ-plasm of a worm is qualitatively different from that of _Amphioxus_, a frog, or a mammal. But if such phyletic stages occur crowded together in the ontogeny of a single species, they are said to be based upon different ‘conditions of tension and movement’ of one and the same idioplasm! It seems to me to be necessary to conclude that if the idioplasm, in the course of phyletic development, undergoes any alteration in specific constitution, such alterations must also take place in ontogeny; so far at least as the phyletic stages are repeated. Either the whole phyletic development is based upon different ‘conditions of tension and movement,’ or if this—as I believe—is impossible, the stages of ontogeny must be based upon qualitative alterations in the idioplasm.