the criterion? Is any better than experience and wisdom and
reason? There cannot be a better, he said. If wealth and gain were
the criterion, then what the lover of gain praised and blamed
would surely be the truest? Assuredly. Of if honor or victory or
courage, in that case the ambitions or contentments would decide
best? Clearly. But since experience and wisdom and reason are the
judges, the inference of course is, that the truest pleasures are
those which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason."[77]
It is thus evident that even if we start out to find the good in
pleasure, we need some kind of measuring art. We need a "standard for
pleasure," and this standard can be found only in wisdom. And this
forces us to maintain that wisdom is after all _the_ good. Not merely
intellectual attainment--a life of intellect without feeling would be
just as little a true human life as would the life of an oyster, which
has feeling with no intelligence. A life which includes sciences and
arts, and the pure pleasures of beauty, presided over by wisdom and
measure and symmetry,--this is Plato's vision of the life of the
individual, viewed from within.
=Eudaemonism.=--Aristotle's conception of the good is fundamentally the
same. It is a full development of man's capacities, culminating in a
rational and harmonious life. If, says Aristotle, we are to find the
ultimate good, we must try to find, if possible, some one end which is
pursued as an end in itself, and never as a means to something else, and
the most general term for this final end is "eudaimonia," or well-being,
"for we also choose it for itself and never for the sake of something
else." What is the essence of well-being? This, according to Aristotle,
is to be found by asking what is the function of man. The life of
nutrition and growth man has in common with the plants; the life of
sense in common with the animal. It is in the life of his rational
nature that we must find his especial function. "The good of man is
exercise of his faculties in accordance with their appropriate
excellence." External goods are valuable because they may be instruments
toward such full activity. Pleasure is to be valued because it "perfects
the activities, and therefore perfects life, which is the aim of human
desire"--rather than valued as an end in itself. No one would choose to
live on condition of having a child's intellect all his life, though he
were to enjoy in the highest possible degree all the pleasures of a
child.[78]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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