=Observing versus Reflecting.=--Customs may be "observed." Indeed, customary morality made goodness or rightness of character practically identical with observing the established order of social estimations in all departments. This word _observe_ is significant: it means to note, or notice as matter of fact, by perception; and it means to yield allegiance, to conform to, in action.[100] The element of intelligence, of reason, is thus reduced to a minimum. The moral values are _there_, so to speak, palpably, tangibly; and the individual has only to use his mind enough to notice them. And since they are forced upon his notice by drastic and unrelaxing methods of discipline, little initiative is required for even the attitude of attention. But when the moral is something which is in customs and habits, rather than those customs themselves, the good and right do not stand out in so obvious and external fashion. Recognition now demands thought, reflection; the power of abstraction and generalization. A child may be shown in a pretty direct and physical fashion the difference between _meum_ and _tuum_ in its bearing upon his conduct: a fence may be pointed at which divides his yard from that of a neighbor and which draws as well the moral line between what is permissible and what is forbidden; a whipping may intensify the observation. But modern business knows also of "intangible" property--good will, reputation, credit. These, indeed, can be bought and sold but the detection of their existence and nature demands an intelligence which is more than perception. The greater number of duties and rights of which present morality consists are of just this type. They are relations, not just outward habits. Their acknowledgment requires accordingly something more than just to follow and reproduce existing customs. It involves power to see _why_ certain habits are to be followed, what _makes_ a thing good or bad. _Conscience_ is thus substituted for _custom_; _principles_ take the place of external _rules_. This is what we mean by calling present morality reflective rather than customary. It is not that social customs have ceased to be, or even have been reduced in number. The exact contrary is the case. It is not that they have shrunk in importance, or that they have less significance for the individual's activity, or claim less of his attention. Again, the reverse is the case. But the individual has to grasp the _meaning_ of these customs over and above the bare fact of their existence, and has to guide himself by their _meaning_ and not by the mere fact noted.[101]