=Different Ways of Emphasizing Results.=--There are, however, different forms of the consequences or "content" theory--as we shall, for convenience, term it. Some writers, like Spencer as quoted, say the only consequences that are good are simply pleasures, and that pleasures differ only in _intensity_, being alike in everything but degree. Others say, pleasure is the good, but pleasures differ in quality as well as intensity and that a certain _kind_ of pleasure is the morally good. Others say that natural satisfaction is not found in any one pleasure, or in any number of them, but in a more permanent mood of experience, which is termed _happiness_. Happiness is different from a pleasure or from a collection of pleasures, in being an abiding consequence or result, which is not destroyed even by the presence of pains (while a pain ejects a pleasure). The pleasure view is called Hedonism; the happiness view, Eudaimonism.[115] =Different Forms of the "Attitude" Theory.=--The opposite school of theory holds that the peculiar character of "moral" good is precisely that it is _not_ found in consequences of action. In this negative feature of the definition many different writers agree; there is less harmony in the positive statement of just what the moral good is. It is an attribute or disposition of character, or the self, not a trait of results experienced, and in general such an attribute is called _Virtue_. But there are as many differences of opinion as to what constitutes virtue as there are on the other side as to what pleasure and happiness are. In one view, it merges, in its outcome at least, very closely with one form of eudaimonism. If happiness be defined as the fulfillment of satisfaction of the characteristic functions of a human being, while a certain function, that of reason, is regarded as _the_ characteristic human trait whose exercise is _the_ virtue or supreme excellence, it becomes impossible to maintain any sharp line of distinction. Kant, however, attempted to cut under this union of happiness and virtue, which under the form of _perfectionism_ has been attempted by many writers, by raising the question of _motivation_. Why does the person aim at perfection? Is it for the sake of the resulting happiness? Then we have only Hedonism. Is it because the moral law, the law of reason, requires it? Then we have law morally deeper than the end aimed at. We may now consider the bearing of this discussion upon theories of moral knowledge and (2) of moral authority.[116]