=Tendency of Each Theory to Pass into the Other.=--Hence each theory, realizing its own onesidedness, tends inevitably to make concessions, and to borrow factors from its competitor, and thus insensibly to bridge the gap between them. Consequences are emphasized, but only _foreseen_ consequences; while to _foresee_ is a mental act whose exercise depends upon character. It is disposition, interest, which leads an agent to estimate the consequences at their true worth; thus an upholder of the "content" theory ends by falling back upon the _attitude_ taken in forecasting and weighing results. In like fashion, the representative of the motive theory dwells upon the tendency of the motive to bring about certain effects. The man with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one who indulges in indiscriminate charity, but the one who considers the effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon society. While lauding the motive as the sole bearer of moral worth, the motive is regarded as a force working towards the production of certain _results_. When the "content" theory recognizes disposition as an inherent factor in bringing about consequences, and the "attitude" theory views motives as forces tending to effect consequences, an approximation of each to the other has taken place which almost cancels the original opposition. It is realized that a complete view of the place of motive in a voluntary act will conceive motive as a motor force; as inspiring to action which will inevitably produce certain results unless this is prevented by superior external force. It is also realized that only _those_ consequences are any part of voluntary behavior which are so congenial to character as to appeal to it as good and stir it to effort to realize them. _We may begin the analysis of a voluntary act at whichever end we please, but we are always carried to the other end in order to complete the analysis._ The so-called distinction between the "inner" and "outer" parts of an act is in reality a distinction between the _earlier_ and the _later_ period of its development. In the following chapter we shall enter upon a direct discussion of the relation of conduct and character to one another; we shall then apply the results of the discussion, in successive chapters, to the problems already raised: The Nature of Good; of Knowledge; of Moral Authority; The Relation of the Self to Others and Society; The Characteristics of the Virtuous Self. LITERATURE Many of the references in ch. xi. trench upon this ground. Compare, also, Lecky, _History of European Morals_, Vol. I., pp. 1-2, and 122-130; Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, pp. 6-11, 77-88 and 494-507; Wundt, _Ethics_, Vol. II., ch. iv.; Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, Book II., ch. ii.; Murray, _Introduction to Ethics_, p. 143; Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, Introduction, and Book II., ch. i. FOOTNOTES: [110] Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, Vol. I., p. 46, and p. 30. (Italics not in original.)