=Source of Ambiguity.=--The nature of this ambiguity may be inferred from the fact that Bentham himself--and in this he is typical of all the utilitarians--combines in his statement two aspects of happiness, or two views of pleasure. He says it is for pleasure and pain alone to "_point out what we ought to do_," that they are the only basis upon which our judgments of right and wrong _ought_ to be formed, or upon which they can be justified. Other things _may_ be taken as pointing out what we ought to do; other standards of judgment--caprice, sympathy, dogma--are employed. But they are not the right and proper ones. Consideration of consequences of the act in the way of effect upon the happiness and misery of all concerned, furnishes the only proper way of regulating the formation of right ends. A certain happiness, that of results, is the standard. But this presupposes that, in any case there is some end, and one which may be improper because not in accord with the standard. Yet this end also must be pleasure. Pleasure and pain "determine what we _shall_ do," whether we act for the maximum of pleasures or not. The "chain of causes" as well as the "standard of right" is fastened to them. We act for pleasure, even when we do not act for the pleasures for which we ought to act. Pleasure or happiness thus appears in a double rôle. Only in the case of _right_ ends, is it the same happiness which serves as a moving spring and as standard of judgment. In other cases, it is one pleasure which is the end in view, and another pleasure, one not in view, or at least not influencing action, which measures rightness. The essence, so to speak, of a wrong act is precisely that the pleasures which produce it are not these pleasures which measure its goodness; the agent is not moved to act by those pleasures and pains which as consequences settle its moral value, but by some pleasure or pain which happens to be strongly felt at the moment of action. =Two Sorts of Good.=--Thus, even from Bentham's point of view, there is a difference between real and apparent happiness, between the good which moves to action and that which, being the standard, should move. If the end of _all_ acts is happiness and yet we require a consideration of results to show us _what_ happiness we are justified in seeking, then "happiness" is in a highly ambiguous position. While from one standpoint, it furnishes the standard of right and wrong; from another, it furnishes the moving spring of all wrong action; it is that which so solicits and tempts us that we fail to employ the right standard for the regulation of our action, and hence go astray. It seems to some (as to Carlyle) that this distinction is so fundamental that it is absurd to say that one and the same thing can be the standard of all right action and the moving spring of all wrong action. Hence they insist upon the fundamental opposition of virtue and happiness.