[142] It will be noted that we have here the same double rôle of pleasure that met us at the outset (see _ante_, p. 267): one sort of happiness is the moving spring of action, because object of desire; another and incompatible sort is the standard, and hence proper or right end. [143] It is this hedonistic element of the object of desire and moving spring which calls forth such denunciations as Carlyle's; on the other hand, it is the assertion of the common happiness as the standard which calls out the indignant denial of the utilitarians; which, for example, leads Spencer to retort upon Carlyle's epithet of "pig-philosophy" with a counter charge that Carlyle's epithet is a survival of "devil-worship," since it assumes pain to be a blessing. (_Principles of Ethics_, Vol. I., pp. 40-41). [144] Abbott's _Kant's Theory of Ethics_, p. 116. [145] _Utilitarianism_, third paragraph of ch. iv. [146] By this phrase Bentham refers to the necessity of controlling this spring to activity just as any other is regulated, by reference to its consequences. [147] Bentham himself was not a psychologist, and he does not state the doctrine in this extreme form. But those of the Benthamites who were psychologists, being hedonistic in their psychology, gave the doctrine this form. [148] _Early Essays_, p. 354. (Reprint by Gibbs, London, 1897.) [149] _Ibid._, p. 357. [150] _Ibid._, p. 404. [151] _Autobiography_, London, 1884, p. 143. [152] _Utilitarianism_, ch. iii., _passim_. [153] Some phases of this view as respects legislation, etc., are touched upon later in ch. xviii. [154] Mill in his article on Bentham says of him: "Personal affection, he well knew, is as liable to operate to the injury of third parties, and requires as much to be kept in check, as any other feeling whatever: and general philanthropy ... he estimated at its true value when divorced from the feeling of duty, as the very weakest and most unsteady of all feelings" (_Op. cit._, p. 356). [155] "It is only a poor sort of happiness that could ever come by caring very much about our own narrow pleasures. We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man, by having wide thought and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good."--GEORGE ELIOT in _Romola_. [156] The recognition of this by many utilitarian hedonists has caused them to have recourse to the supernaturally inflicted penalties and conferred delights of a future life to make sure of balancing up the account of virtue as self-sacrificing action with happiness, its proper end. [157] The recognition of this type of spiritual selfishness is modern. It is the pivot upon which the later (especially) of Ibsen's tragedies turn. CHAPTER XVI THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE; MORAL KNOWLEDGE