The conflict of duty and desire is thus an accompaniment of a _growing_ self. Spencer's complete disappearance of obligation would mean an exhausted and fossilized self; wherever there is progress, tension arises between what is already accomplished and what is possible. In a being whose "reach should exceed his grasp," a conflict within the self making for the readjustment of the direction of powers must always be found. The value of continually _having to meet the expectations and requirements of others is in keeping the agent from resting on his oars, from falling back on habits already formed as if they were final_. The phenomena of duty in all their forms are thus phenomena attendant upon the expansion of ends and the reconstruction of character. So far, accordingly, as the recognition of duty is capable of operating as a distinct rëenforcing motive, it operates most effectively, not as an interest in duty, or law in the abstract, but as an interest in progress in the face of the obstacles found within character itself. LITERATURE The most important references on the subject of duty are given in the text. To these may be added: Ladd, _Philosophy of Conduct_, chs. v. and xv.; Mackenzie, _Manual_, Part I., ch. iv.; Green, _Prolegomena_, pp. 315-320, 353-354 and 381-388; Sharp, _International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. II., pp. 500-513; Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_, Book II., ch. ii.; McGilvary, _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI., pp. 333-352; Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, pp. 161-171; Sturt, _International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. VII., 334-345; Schurman, _Philosophical Review_, Vol. III., pp. 641-654; Guyau, _Sketch of Morals, without Obligation or Sanction_. FOOTNOTES: [166] _Last Essays on Church and Religion_, preface. [167] Historically it has often taken theological form. Thus Paley defined virtue as "doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." Of obligation he said, "A man is said to be obliged, when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another." [168] The earlier English utilitarians (though not called by that name), such as Tucker and Paley, assert that upon this earth there is no exact coincidence of the right and the pleasure-giving; that it is future rewards and punishments which make the equilibrium. Sidgwick, among recent writers, has also held that no complete identification of virtue and happiness can be found apart from religious considerations. (See _Methods of Ethics_, p. 505. For theological utilitarianism see Albee, _History_.) [169] See his _Utilitarianism_, ch. iii. CHAPTER XVIII THE PLACE OF THE SELF IN THE MORAL LIFE