[181] Compare Spencer's criticisms of Bentham's view of happiness as a social standard in contrast with his own ideal of freedom. See _Ethics_, Vol. I., pp. 162-168. [182] See Addams, _Democracy and Social Ethics_, ch. ii. [183] Compare the following extreme words of Sumner (_Folkways_, p. 9): "The great question of world philosophy always has been, what is the real relation between happiness and goodness? It is only within a few generations that men have found courage to say there is none." But when Sumner, in the next sentence, says, "The whole strength of the notion that they are correlated is in the opposite experience which proves that no evil thing brings happiness," one may well ask what more relation any reasonable man would want. For it indicates that "goodness" consists in active interest in those things which really bring happiness; and while it by no means follows that this interest will _bring_ even a preponderance of pleasure over pain to the person, it is always open to him to _find_ and _take_ his dominant happiness in making this interest dominant in his life. CHAPTER XIX THE VIRTUES INTRODUCTORY =Definition of Virtue.=--It is upon the self, upon the agent, that ultimately falls the burden of maintaining and of extending the values which make life reasonable and good. The worth of science, of art, of industry, of relationship of man and wife, parent and child, teacher and pupil, friend and friend, citizen and State, exists only as there are characters consistently interested in such goods. Hence any trait of character which makes for these goods is esteemed; it is given positive value; while any disposition of selfhood found to have a contrary tendency is condemned--has negative value. The habits of character whose effect is to sustain and spread the rational or common good are virtues; the traits of character which have the opposite effect are vices.