When Belgium was erected into an independent state by the Treaty of London in 1839, a question that had been settled after Napoleonic wars was reopened. Great Britain, Prussia, and France were equally suspicious each of the others. Through Belgium Prussia could menace France and France Prussia. Through Belgium either Prussia or France could menace Great Britain. France had determined to keep control of the Meuse valley as far north as possible. Prussia had determined to bar the road to the Rhine. Great Britain had determined to prevent Antwerp from becoming a port of war on the North Sea. All three nations agreed to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. But they took additional precautions. Great Britain insisted that Holland should remain in control of both banks of the Scheldt at its mouth. Prussia had insisted on Holland retaining a portion of Limburg and upon the separate political existence of a portion of Luxemburg. France insisted upon a tongue of land in the Ardennes on both sides of the Meuse. The three powers worked the problem out in terms of their own interests and not those of the new country. They drew the boundaries of Belgium with no regard for her strategic interests. But strategic consideration for Belgium did not have to enter in. Was she not to be neutralized? When Belgium came to the Peace Conference her statesmen felt justified in pointing out that the common guarantee of neutrality had not worked when put to a supreme test; for the early days of the war had proved how disastrous was the control of the entrance to Antwerp in the hands of a neutral state. And, if the war had gone on, Maestricht as neutral territory would have been a tremendous handicap to the advance of Allied armies. Why, they asked, should consideration be shown to Holland now? Her neutral rôle in the World War was inglorious, and just lately her conduct in receiving the fleeing Kaiser and refusing to deliver him up to justice was an unfriendly act. In themselves the arguments were powerful. Holland could not have resisted a united demand of the Entente Powers to consent to the revision of the old Treaty of London in favor of Belgium. But, even with Germany eliminated from the problem, the motives that had actuated the treaty-makers of 1839 were still alive. British and French statesmen could not build for the future on the dangerous assumption that their countries were to remain forever friends. Maestricht was a barrier that worked both ways, while the North Sea policy of Great Britain dictated more than ever, now that submarines were in vogue, the advisability of keeping Antwerp bottled up. With the Dutch East Indies at the mercy of the British fleet, Great Britain had a powerful argument that could be always used to compel Holland to maintain the neutrality of the estuary of the Scheldt.