Herr Bauer, who succeeded Herr Scheidemann just before the signing of
the Treaty of Versailles, formed a cabinet that lasted month after
month only because the German people were morally and politically
dazed. The extreme Left, demanding Bolshevism, and the extreme Right,
demanding a repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles, offered hopeless
anarchy. Consequently the Center parties combined against a common
danger. The Government could have been stabilized and could have
established its authority only by securing support from the conquerors
of Germany. Hope of a reasonable settlement of the reparations issue
held together the Bauer Government and enabled it to put down the
reactionary Kapp _coup d’état_ in Berlin in March, 1920. But it was
immediately followed by a Spartacist insurrection in the Ruhr and
elsewhere, with which Herr Bauer could not cope. For the Ruhr was in
the neutral zone, and the French refused to permit Germany to use force
there.
The new cabinet, headed by Herr Müller, could not get permission from
the Allies, owing to the intransigeance of the French, to put down the
Communist uprising, which threatened to make all Germany Bolshevist.
In desperation, the Germans went into the Ruhr without waiting for
permission and succeeded in a few days in subduing the Communists.
Invoking an infraction of the treaty, and acting independently of their
allies, the French seized Frankfort. Some of the occupying troops were
blacks, and a machine-gun was turned on a crowd in the streets of
Frankfort.
It is impossible to overestimate the effect in Germany of these events.
Public opinion was convinced that France was seeking, not reparations,
but the destruction of Germany. How else explain her unwillingness to
allow the German Government to put down the Ruhr insurrection, whose
success would have rendered any payments on the reparations account
impossible? How else explain the refusal of France, a fortnight later,
to accept the suggestion of Premiers Lloyd George and Nitti that the
German Government be invited to confer with the Allied Governments on
reparations and disarmament at San Remo? We have seen elsewhere how
the British and Italians at San Remo agreed to stiffen their attitude
toward Germany in return for concessions to Great Britain in the Near
East and to Italy in the Adriatic.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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