The British Government believed that there were sources of wealth that could be tapped for reparations, if only sufficient pressure were brought to bear. Germany was an industrial nation, like Great Britain, and her statesmen and captains of industry knew that rehabilitation in world markets depended upon doing the right thing in the way of reparations. The British contended that the bill should be cut down if Germany made a decent effort to meet her creditors half-way, and that if a bit of bribing accompanied the bullying the question could be settled to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. The British were eager to see an end to the upset condition of Europe, which retarded seriously the recovery of trade upon which they were dependent. The economic aspect of the reparations question was paramount, if British interests were to be protected; and Bonar Law was no more ready to ignore the economic considerations than Lloyd George had been. To the French the recovery of reparations from Germany had been a political question from the time the Treaty of Versailles was signed. The guarantees for the execution of the treaty provided by the Rhineland occupation were deemed insufficient. The Cologne area, south of the Ruhr, was to be evacuated in 1924, the Coblenz area in 1929, and the last troops withdrawn from the Mainz area in 1934. If this progressive evacuation were allowed to take place, where would France stand after fifteen years? Economists, financial experts, and bankers might argue convincingly about the best plan for getting reparations from Germany. France could not afford to agree to any practical program for reparations. For if she did, and Germany paid up, the Rhine frontier and the sword kept pointed at the heart of industrial Germany would no longer be possible. Rid of her enemies, Germany would swiftly prepare a war of revenge. Poincaré had explained the determination of France to take extreme measures on the ground that without large sums from Germany, immediately paid, France would be unable to avoid a financial crash. But the money really mattered little. The prime consideration was to make France secure by rendering Germany impotent. The Bonar Law proposals afforded Germany an opportunity to break loose from the strangle-hold of France. To prevent this French public opinion was behind Poincaré in risking the disruption of the Entente.