Everyday Objects; Or, Picturesque Aspects of Natural History.Adams, W. H. Davenport (William Henry Davenport)
History
Everyday Objects; Or, Picturesque Aspects of Natural History.
Adams, W. H. Davenport (William Henry Davenport)
Natural history
It would be easy for me to develop this parallel by other and still
more remarkable facts; but what I have just said will suffice to
show that the line of demarcation which philosophers have, upon
principle, desired to trace between the physical and moral order,
has turned the mind aside from many fertile fields of research and
speculation. Let us cite an example. The sun is the visible centre
of light, heat, organic life; in fine, of all the movements of our
material world. Yet it is but a relative focus, since the sun, with
its planetary train, revolves, probably, in company with other suns
or systems, around a centre as yet unknown; and as there is no reason
why we should pause in this cycloidal progression, this second centre
or focus of systems may revolve around a third, the third around
a fourth, and so on. Thus we shall have an indeterminate series
of relative centres; for the term does not exist of which we can
say,--there is the beginning, or here is the end of the series.
We do not meet with the absolute in the material, any more than in
the intellectual world. Truth, by its power of attraction, sets in
motion all the wheels of our understanding; we seek after it eagerly,
in the doubt which torments us, in the obscurity which surrounds us;
we all feel the need of being enlightened by it, and warmed, and
revivified; we all are in need of belief, and, at the same time, of
possessing--let there be no illusion in this respect--a certainty or
demonstration of what we believe.
But the truth which we think our own does not leave the mind at rest;
a slight effort suffices, in fact, to teach us that the truth we
accept depends upon another and remoter truth, and that the world
of thought is thus carried onward in an interminable series of
relative truths; unless we find it more convenient to pause here at a
primary cause, as elsewhere at a primordial centre, which we may ever
identify with the primary cause. But is this truth, supposed to be
final, capable of satisfying equally every mind? With this question,
dear reader, I close my parenthesis.
* * * * *
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account