happened any proof that its cause X was bound to occur--and so we may work back to the beginning of the alphabet. The fact that B took place shows that A actually occurred, but not that A, rather than A₁ or A₂, was bound to occur. And if A is the beginning, what was the nature of the necessity (prior to the beginning of things) which determined in favour of A rather than A₁ or A₂? We may indeed say, if we like--since no one can prevent us from saying things without proof or probability--that the mere fact that A happened shows that it was bound to happen. But then we might just as well have said it of Z, and saved ourselves the trouble of going through so much alphabet to get so little result. We might just as well say that as the explosion or the accident _did_ happen as a matter of fact, it could not possibly have been prevented: Z was bound to happen under the circumstances, therefore the circumstances could not have been altered; only one result was possible under the conditions, therefore no other conditions were possible. Or--to go back to the beginning of the alphabet once more--we may say with science that we are content with the fact that A did happen, or, since science does not profess to take us back to an absolute beginning (force and matter being eternal and without beginning), let us say we may, like science, be content with the fact that K can be shown to have happened; but whether K, rather than K₁ or K₂, was bound to occur there is nothing in science to show. If we take up this, the scientific, attitude, two consequences follow. First, there is nothing in science to require or countenance the metaphysical theory of necessity. Next, what is true of K is equally true of L or M or Z. The fact that L or M or Z occurred proves that the conditions did combine in the way necessary to produce L or M or Z, not that they were bound to combine in that way and could not have combined so as to produce L₁ or L₂, or Z₁ or Z₂ or Z₃.