If, then, in the physical world neither science nor the uniformity of nature requires us to believe in necessity, there is no antecedent presumption that necessity must be the law of the spiritual world: we may examine the facts of our own inner experience without prejudice. What the freedom of the will implies is that the mind has present to it more alternatives or motives than one, and that they are real alternatives and real motives, _i.e._ motives which may really in this particular case influence action, alternatives any one of which may be adopted in this case. The circumstances or conditions in which a man makes up his mind are, until he has made up his mind, so to speak, held in solution, and may be precipitated this way or that at his choice, or not precipitated at all, unless he chooses. The fact that in the same circumstances the same result ensues is no argument against the freedom of the will, if it be remembered that the will is itself one of the circumstances which contribute to the result, just as the mass of a body, as well as the force applied to it, helps to determine its velocity. The statement of the case then becomes this: if all the circumstances of the case be the same, and the will be the same, the consequences (_i.e._ the determination of the will) also will be the same. But the necessitarian position requires the statement that if all the circumstances be the same, then without any further proviso the will is determined by the circumstances; or, to put it another way, that the will does not in any way contribute to the result, which is just as though we were to say that the mass of a body had nothing to do with its velocity. But if the will does contribute to the result, _i.e._ to the determination of itself, it is in part self-determining.