The conception of a "positive" philosophy--that is, a philosophy which
confines itself to positive facts, and which is "agnostic" in the sense
that it does not profess to know what it knows it does not know--is
borrowed from science. It is an attempt to carry the methods of science
into the domain of philosophy, to substitute science for philosophy. The
attempt is made under the impression that science does not profess to
know what it knows it does not know, _i.e._ makes no assumptions and
takes nothing on faith. That impression, however, is, as we have argued
in the last chapter but one, a false impression: the Uniformity of
Nature is a pure--and rational--assumption. If, therefore, a philosophy
confined itself strictly within the bounds of science, it would not be
strictly positive or agnostic: it would still make some assumptions,
even if only those made by science, and would still, even if it confined
itself to the positive facts of science, be taking something on faith. A
sound philosophy is one, not that makes no assumptions, but which seeks
to find out what assumptions are made by any department of knowledge or
practice--science, art, evolution, morality, religion--and how far those
assumptions will carry us. The bane of philosophy is not making
assumptions--all thought does--but is thinking you have made none.
Common sense assumes that the testimony of consciousness, so far as it
can be verified by consciousness, can be trusted as evidence of the
reality of that which is presented to it. Positive or agnostic
philosophies, whether of the optimistic or the pessimistic type, on the
principle of making no assumptions, reject this one, either on the
ground that the Real is Unknowable (which is itself an assumption as
incapable of proof or disproof as the assumption that the Real is
Knowable) or on the ground that we only know our states of
consciousness, and cannot know whether there is or is not any reality
beyond them (which again is simply an assumption that consciousness as
evidence of a reality beyond itself is not to be trusted).
Now, granted that common sense makes an assumption here, as it assuredly
does, it is one such as can only be rejected by making a
counter-assumption: to refuse to trust consciousness as evidence of a
reality beyond itself is to make the assumption that it is not
trustworthy--which may or may not be true, but is just as much an
assumption as the supposition of its trustworthiness is. The positive
and agnostic philosophies, therefore, do not succeed in avoiding
assumptions in this matter: they only tacitly add another to that which
they have already unconsciously made by assuming that Nature is uniform.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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