Since each organism begins its life as an egg we must not suppose that the primitive conditions of the time, when only single-celled amœbas existed on our planet, are repeated. The egg-cell of a living mammal is not, according to Hertwig’s hypothesis, an indifferent structure without much specialization like an amœba, but is an extraordinarily complex end-product of a long historical process, which the organized substance has passed through. If the egg of a mammal is different from that of a reptile, or of an amphibian, because in its organization it contains the basis of a mammal, just so much more must it be different from the hypothetical one-celled amœba, which has no other characteristics than those that go to make up an amœba. Expressed more generally, the developmental process in the many-celled organisms begins, not where it began in primitive times, but as the representation of the highest point which the organization has at present reached. The development commences with the egg, because it is the elemental and fundamental form in which organic life is represented in connection with the reproductive process, and also because it contains in itself the properties of the species in its primordia. “The egg-cell of the present time, and its one-celled predecessor in the phylogenetic history, the amœba, are only comparable in so far as they fall under the common definition of the cell, but beyond this they are extraordinarily different from each other.” “The phyletic series must be divided into two different kinds of processes:—First. The evolution of the species-cell, which is a steady advance from a simple to a complex organization. Second. The periodically repeated development of the many-celled individual out of the single cell, representative of the species (or the individual ontogeny), which in general follows the same rules as the preceding ontogeny, but is each time somewhat modified according to the amount to which the species-cell has itself been changed in the phylogeny. Similar restricting and explanatory additions to the biogenetic law, like those stated here for the one-celled stage, must be made in other directions. Undoubtedly there exists in a certain sense a parallel between the phylogenetic, and the ontogenetic, development. “On the basis of the general developmental hypothesis on which we stand, all forms which in the chain of ancestors were end-products of the individual development are now passed through by their descendants as embryonic stages, and so in a certain degree are recapitulated. We also admit that the embryonic forms of higher animals have many points of comparison with the mature forms of related groups standing lower in the system.