1259. Sympathy between the parent and child, between husband and wife, and likewise occasionally between brothers and sisters, or such friends as Pylades and Orestes, may be so strong as to induce the risk, if not the loss of life, but this sympathy cannot be self-induced. Where, from principle, a person may determine to make the sacrifice, not from impulse, he cannot endow himself with the sensitiveness which would make him feel for the sufferer as for himself. A being may admire such a sentiment, and have an ambition to be so actuated, but that would not create the sensibility to which its existence is due. It has been alleged that Napoleon’s mother said of him, as I remember to have read somewhere: “He wished to have a good heart.” The most that can be done is to act as if we did love, and consequently sympathize, so as to feel the pains and privations of another as if they were our own. But it were inconsistent to entertain a love so powerful and peculiar, and not give our time, thought, services, or attention to the object of our affection. It were inconsistent so to love and keep at a distance, and behave toward the object as if we were indifferent. But were the sentiment to be felt universally, or even generally, there would be such a cutting up of our time, service, or attention, that, as respects any individual in particular, it would be nugatory, and might as well not exist. There would likewise be such a multiplicity and perplexity of yearnings that it would distract the heart, perhaps place it in a less happy condition than if it were devoid of any affection whatever. 1260. Although temporal life may at times be sacrificed by one being to save that of another, it is manifestly because the being who makes the sacrifice is constituted so nobly as to endure less pain under the circumstances in question in making than avoiding self-immolation. But can any one who has not been so organized and educated as to make such a sacrifice, be sufficiently changed by preaching, or monition, to undergo self-immolation to save a fellow-creature? 1261. Is it reasonable to order, direct, or advise people to love, especially on the part of any one who by his acknowledged omnipotency could so constitute them as to sympathize to any required extent? I admit, that it may be consistent to urge them to act toward others, as far as possible, as if they were _loved_.[25]