In concluding the first book, Barbeyrac observes: "To refute in detail all the objections of rigid moralists would require an entire volume. What I have already said, however, appears to me sufficient to remove any vain scruples which may have been excited on the subject. I am, indeed, rather apprehensive that those who are too fond of play will think that I might have spared myself the trouble of proving that which they had no doubts about; and that it was quite unnecessary to explain to them at so great length that play, considered in itself, contains nothing contrary to the law of Nature or the precepts of the Gospel. The plan of the work, however, required that I should commence with this; and the opportunity being thus afforded of showing the fallacy of the austere portrait which some writers have drawn of Christian morality, I have availed myself of it. On this subject I also feel myself justified in referring to the schools of Pagan philosophy, where we are taught that 'we should do nothing without being able to give a reason for it; in small matters as well as in great.'[330] Now, assuming that out of a hundred persons who are accustomed to play daily, there is scarcely one who has ever asked himself how, or in what manner, it may be lawful, it is not surprising that so many people should convert a thing in itself perfectly harmless into a subject of disorder, employing it as a means of gratifying their inordinate love of pleasure, their idleness, or their avarice." In the second book, wherein he discusses the essentials of play--le Jeu--he distinguishes three kinds of games: 1, Games of pure skill; 2, Games of pure chance; and, 3, Games which depend partly on skill and partly on chance. Games of skill are those which depend on manual dexterity, bodily agility, or mental acuteness: Billiards, Racket, Quoits, Cricket, Draughts, and Chess are of this kind. Games of pure chance are those in which the event, though brought about by the instrumentality of the players, is yet absolutely beyond their direction or control: of this kind are Dice, and certain games at cards, such as Basset, Brelan, Lansquenet, Rouge-et-Noir, and Faro. In the third kind, such as Backgammon and most of the usual games at cards,[331] the effects of chance may in some degree be counteracted by a skilful application of principles derived from a knowledge of the various combinations which result from the conventional rules of the game. In all games for any considerable stake, that is, with regard to the means of the parties, it is necessary that the players should be as nearly as possible equal in point of skill; for, in this case, the game becomes a kind of traffic, and is subject to all the conditions of an equitable contract.