It will thus be seen that the very contrivance intended to stave off the vicious effects of artificial capitalization is contributing, by a sort of punitive process, towards the end of reducing earnings to a just ratio to the true value of the properties. The weakness of the pool, arising from its temptations to new competitors to enter the field, is not the only cause of its failure. Up to this time it has been found impossible to find a form of pool stringent enough to restrain the members from cutting rates against each other. The modes of possible evasion are so numerous, the sacrifices of special advantages that each member has to make are so galling, the small share that remains to each road in a numerously divided business is so small, and the temptations of agents to get freight “by hook or by crook,” in dull times are so irresistible, that the strictest watching and the severest penalties fail to secure a faithful observance of the pool agreements. Much forbearance is shown towards transgressions, and deliberate violations have to be condoned or connived at; but, all the time, the pools are in imminent danger of jealousies and breaches of faith causing their disruption. No sooner have they won public confidence by maintaining harmony through a period of prosperous business, than the public wake up to find that some member has been secretly “cutting,” and the agreements are torn to pieces.