"The railroads are now embarrassed to supply you; and supplies here wait for the return of cars detained while loaded near your position," was the telegram of General Meigs from Washington. On the 10th of October, General Stuart with two thousand Rebel cavalry crossed the Potomac, near the town of Hancock; visited Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, turned toward the east, rode round McClellan's army, and escaped with little loss into Virginia. General McClellan's plans for his capture failed. The army was mortified, and the people indignant; but the raid, although nothing came of it, gave great pleasure to the Rebels. President Lincoln sent a friendly letter to General McClellan. "You remember," he wrote, "my speaking to you, of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume, that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be, at least, his equal in power, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraph General Halleck, that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own. You seem to act as if this applies _against_ you, but cannot apply in your _favor_. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not, he would break your communications with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.... You know, I desired but did not order you to cross the Potomac below, instead of above, the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize, if he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. "I say 'try.' If we never try we never shall succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of communication to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment.