Frederick the Great and the Rise of PrussiaReddaway, William Fiddian
History
Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia
Reddaway, William Fiddian
Frederick II, King of Prussia, 1712-1786; Prussia (Germany) -- History -- Frederick II, 1740-1786
Frederick’s courage was not foolhardiness, for the very reason that he
was one, and his enemies were many. Every coalition must encounter the
difficulty of concerting a plan of campaign acceptable to all and the
still greater difficulty of securing honest and punctual co-operation.
The coalition against Frederick had the advantage that several of its
members could serve the common cause by following the course most
profitable to themselves. The Russians might be expected to overrun
Ost-Preussen and the Swedes to attack Prussian Pomerania with the
best will in the world, while the Austrians had every incentive to be
vigorous in the conquest of Silesia. But France consented to help to
make Silesia and Glatz Austrian chiefly in order that she might secure
Austrian help nearer to her own borders. The motley forces of the
Empire had little interest in the quarrel, and the activity of Russia
depended upon a czarina whose health was bad. Speed and secrecy were
alike unattainable by a machine which could be set in motion only after
debate between the Board of War at Vienna, the corrupt and factious
Court at St. Petersburg, and the inharmonious ministers of France.
Once set in motion, however, the gigantic machine seemed irresistible.
Kaunitz could launch battalions against Prussia from every point of the
compass. Although a new English minister, William Pitt, seemed disposed
to stand by Frederick, it might well be thought incredible that
Prussia could escape destruction at the hands of such a multitude.
Frederick’s plain course was to make use of the speed and secrecy for
which the Prussian movements were famous. The Queen was massing troops
in Bohemia. She had determined to raise 150,000 men, but with sisterly
partiality she halved their effectiveness by appointing Prince Charles
to the command. This appointment favoured the plan which Mitchell
admired so highly. Frederick was devising a new form of the manœuvre by
which he decoyed the Austrians to Hohenfriedberg. He was so successful
that everyone on the Austrian side believed that his one object was to
maintain himself in Saxony. To them the four sham-invasions of Bohemia
seemed to be designed to conceal the King’s defensive operations and
to paralyse their own attack. The illusion was strengthened because at
the same time they learned that Torgau and Dresden were being fortified
in all haste and that barricades were rising on the roads from Bohemia
into Saxony. The last thing that they could suspect was that Frederick
was on the eve of attacking.
[Illustration: LEOPOLD, COUNT VON DAUN.
FROM A COPPER PRINT.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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