We have not to go far back in English history to observe the same tendency in the House of Commons. The English Chamber has dealt with Mr. Gladstone in the French fashion. The dissentient Liberals caused his downfall with no more regard for his splendid reputation than if they had been so many French deputies. They had, no doubt, a perfect right to act independently, but it was an assertion of the power of numbers in the House of Commons against the authority of genius and renown. [Sidenote: Mr. Frederic Harrison on the Autocracy of the House.] “In spite of appearances,” said Mr. Frederic Harrison on the 1st of January 1886, “and conventional formulas, habits, and fictions to the contrary, the House of Commons represents the most absolute autocracy ever set up by a great nation since the French Revolution. Government here is now merely a committee of that huge democratic club, the House of Commons, without any of the reserves of power in other parts of the constitution which are to be found in the constitutions of France and the United States.” [Sidenote: Small Practical Value of Paper Guarantees.] [Sidenote: Only one real Power in France.] America lies outside of our present subject, but with regard to France there is little to be said for “the reserves of power in other parts of the constitution.” They look very reassuring on paper, in reality their effect is feeble. It is plain that President Grévy had the clearest right to stay at his post, and he had no desire to abandon it. He had been guilty of no crime or misdemeanour, he had been invested with authority for seven years. What was that authority worth when it came to a contest with the Chamber? Dissolution? The senate dared not help him to dissolve. When that saddened and broken old man followed his luggage out of the courtyard of the Elysée the world knew that there was only one real power in France. [Sidenote: Cameral Jealousy a Safeguard of Liberty.] [Sidenote: But unfavourable to vigorous Policy.] The inference from these events in the two countries is that the tendency of this new thing, cameral government, may at first be to create a powerful despot with the support of the chamber, but that after longer experience an elected chamber will become wary and keep very much on its guard against eminent persons, however eloquent, and will be jealous of them and keep them down. This watchful jealousy in a chamber may turn out to be the best of all safeguards for national liberty--it saved France from the authority of Gambetta, a man of a most despotic disposition--but it is unfavourable to an _esprit de suite_ in policy or to a vigorous policy of any kind, either at home or abroad, as we may all see by the ephemeral French cabinets, in which mediocrity and obscurity appear to be positive recommendations. [Sidenote: Effect of Political on Religious Liberty. Political Revolution and Religious Change.] [Sidenote: In France.] [Sidenote: In England.]