Frenzied Finance, Vol. 1: The Crime of AmalgamatedLawson, Thomas William
History
Frenzied Finance, Vol. 1: The Crime of Amalgamated
Lawson, Thomas William
Amalgamated Copper Co.; Gas companies -- Massachusetts -- Boston; Insurance -- United States; Speculation; Standard Oil Company
I carried the message in person. The Utah people were absolutely
panic-stricken. Such an announcement meant destruction to the pretty
price-fabric they were rearing, and they begged to be allowed to make a
proposition to Rogers before he should declare himself. This was their
proposal: That Mr. Rogers should admit their property to the
consolidation provided he found it good enough; that every facility
should be accorded his experts to examine the mine; and that if the
report was favorable, and they were convinced that it would be, and he
decided to take hold, he should be given an option on a block of stock
way below the market.
This offer I took back to Mr. Rogers, who smiled one of his thin, easy
smiles, and questioned me closely about the genuineness of the market
for this stock. Could 50,000 shares be sold readily? I assured him that
when it once became known that we were even looking at Utah it would be
easy to sell 100,000 shares and at constantly advancing prices.
"All right," said Mr. Rogers, "if you're sure of this we'll go ahead.
Tell them we'll take a sixty-day option on 50,000 shares, no liability
to us, at--well, we'll be liberal, say at 15, and when you mention the
price impress upon them that I know it cost them but $2 to $4."
I returned at once and began negotiations, but, as is usually the case,
the fact that "Standard Oil" was nibbling leaked before I had clinched
the option, and before we had even begun to examine the property, prices
had advanced until there was a profit of $500,000 for us in the
transaction. To look over the Utah property Mr. Rogers sent his
son-in-law, Broughton, and in a short time I got word to feed out the
50,000 shares on the market at the best prices obtainable, and to borrow
it for delivery in such ways that the Clark-Ward-Untermyer contingent
should suspect nothing about it. No information was given me as to the
expert's report, and I was absolutely ignorant whether it was good, bad,
or indifferent, though from the fact that we were to sell the stock I
inferred that it was unfavorable. The public took the 50,000 shares at
between 32 and 36, much as an elephant takes in water after a thirsty
tramp across sandy deserts--the shares were just sucked in without a
gulp or a gasp. I did not know until long afterward that the purchasers
were the English holders who had contributed the greater part of the
50,000 shares to meet our option--in other words, were buying back from
us their own stock at more than twice the price we were to pay them for
it, and that their eagerness was due to confidential information that
the expert's examination had disclosed such richness that the price
would surely jump to over $100 when "Standard Oil" assumed the
management. Just where they acquired this information or how it was put
in their path was a matter I never found out. As I have previously
demonstrated, "Standard Oil" has its own system of wires and underground
passages and rumor bureaus.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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