From Isolation to Leadership, Revised: A Review of American Foreign PolicyLatané, John Holladay
History
From Isolation to Leadership, Revised: A Review of American Foreign Policy
Latané, John Holladay
United States -- Foreign relations
When, after the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, the question of the
allowance of capital ship tonnage for France and Italy was taken up in
committee, the other powers were wholly unprepared for France's demand
of 350,000 tons of capital ships. According to Hughes's figures based
on existing strength, she was entitled to 175,000 tons. It is not
probable that the French delegates intended to insist on such a large
tonnage. It is more likely that they put forth this proposal in the
committee in order to give the other delegates to understand that
France could not be ignored or dictated to with impunity and in order
to pave the way for their submarine proposal. Unfortunately the French
demands were given to the press through some misunderstanding and
caused an outburst of criticism in the British and American papers. In
the committee the relations between the British and French delegates
became very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon the
submarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarine
tonnage. On December 16 Secretary Hughes cabled an appeal, over the
heads of the French delegation, to Briand, who had returned to Paris.
As a result, the French finally agreed to accept the 1.75 ratio for
capital ships, but refused to place any reasonable limits upon
cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or aircraft. Italy accepted the same
ratio as France.
Thus an important part of the Hughes program failed. As a result, the
treaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, if
they so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerial
warfare. As is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as Sir
Percy Scott in England and Admiral Sims in this country, believe that
the capital ship is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of the
future will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surface
ships. The unfortunate feature of the situation created by the naval
treaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital ship as
obsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press their
submarine and aircraft programs. There is no limitation upon the
building of cruisers, provided they do not exceed 10,000 tons
displacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches.
By Article 19 of the naval treaty the United States, Great Britain, and
Japan agreed to maintain the _status quo_ as regards fortifications and
naval bases in the islands of the Pacific with certain exceptions,
notably the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and New Zealand. This
agreement relieves Japan of all fear of attack from us, and let us hope
that it may prove as beneficent and as enduring as the agreement of
1817 between the United States and Great Britain for disarmament on the
Great Lakes.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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