Chitral is an important state by reason of its situation at the extremity of the country over which the Government of India exerts its influence. Sir Francis Younghusband has described this state as “one of the chinks in the wall of defence. Not a very large one, but certainly capable of being made into a considerable one if we do not look after it, and in time; for not only is there a chink just here, but the wall is thinner too. Practicable roads across the mountains, especially those by the Baroghil and Dorah passes, lead into Chitral; while the width of the mountains from the plains on the south to the plains on the north, as the crow flies, is 400 miles by the Pamirs and Gilgit, but through Chitral only 200. So Chitral is a place to be looked after and efficiently guarded.” [Sidenote: Importance of Chitral] Gilgit and Chitral seemed to the Government of India to afford good watch-towers whence the country south of the Hindu Kush might be guarded and controlled, since the northern passes provide a difficult but by no means impracticable route for the incursion of a hostile force large enough to cause trouble, or at least excitement, upon this portion of the Border. But our occupation of Chitral is not universally approved. Sir Thomas Holdich[80] has said that “the retention of Chitral may well be regarded as a doubtful advantage.... As an outpost to keep watch and ward for an advance from the north, Chitral is useless, for no serious menace is possible from the north. As a safeguard otherwise, it is hard to say from what it will protect us. It is in short the outcome of political, not of military, strategy. As a political centre it must be remembered that it possesses an outlook westwards over the hills and valleys through which the Amir’s great commercial roads have been projected, as well as northwards to the Hindu Kush passes. But it is at best an expensive and burdensome outpost, and is, on the whole, the least satisfactory of all the forward positions that we have recently occupied.” Elsewhere,[81] however, Sir Thomas Holdich seems in some degree to qualify these opinions. Writing of these northern mountain approaches to India, he says, “We cannot altogether leave them alone. They have to be watched by the official guardians of our frontier, and all the gathered threads of them converging on Leh or Gilgit must be held by hands that are alert and strong. It is just as dangerous an error to regard such approaches to India as negligible quantities in the military and political field of Indian defence, as to take a serious view of their practicability for purposes of invasion.... The Dorah Pass ... is the one gateway which is normally open from year to year, and its existence renders necessary an advanced watchtower at Chitral.”