From the Black Mountain to Waziristan: Being an account of the border countries and the more turbulent of the tribes controlled by the north-west frontier province, and of our military relations with them in the pastWylly, H. C. (Harold Carmichael)
History
From the Black Mountain to Waziristan: Being an account of the border countries and the more turbulent of the tribes controlled by the north-west frontier province, and of our military relations with them in the past
The troops being for the most part all on the spot, in consequence of
the conclusion, then just arrived at, of the Zakha Khel expedition, no
time was lost, and on the 24th April an advance was made with all troops
available at Shabkadar and Matta, when the enemy’s positions to the west
of these posts were attacked and captured. A heavy blow was inflicted on
the Mohmands, and a reconnaissance, carried out on the following day,
found no signs of them about their former positions or in the Gandab
Valley. It was, however, very clear that the rising was not crushed; the
mullahs were doing their best to enlist recruits in Dir and Swat, and an
attempt was also being made to induce the Zakha Khels to join, so far,
however, without success; but there seemed small doubt that all branches
of the Mohmands were represented in the recent actions with our columns
from Matta and Shabkadar. For some few days after the dispersal of the
gathering in front of Shabkadar, the British troops remained inactive,
in order to see whether the assembly of the tribal jirgah, which had
been arranged for, would enable General Willcocks to arrive at
reasonable terms.
It had been hoped that the disinclination shown by the tribes of Dir,
Swat, Bajaur and the Bazar Valley to make common cause with the
Mohmands, and the difficulty of keeping the lashkar in the field, would
have led to the gradual dispersal of the whole gathering, especially in
view of the projected meeting of the jirgah on the 4th May.
On the 2nd May, however, the Viceroy telegraphed to the India Office
explaining that the centre of unrest had now shifted to the Khyber,
where for some time past at Pesh-Bolak one Sufi Sahib, a noted
firebrand, had been collecting a force of Afghans. This army, whose
numbers were estimated at anything between 13,000 and 20,000 men, had
already passed Lundi Khana, and was believed to intend an attack on the
fortified serai at Lundi Kotal that evening, and possibly also on Ali
Musjid and the fort at Chora belonging to the Malikdin Khel chief, who
had often proved himself our friend.
[Sidenote: The Khyber Danger]
In consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs troops were
despatched to Jamrud with a view to rendering assistance, and the
Mohmand Field Force was directed to remain strictly on the defensive.
The General Officer left in command was further instructed, when the
jirgah assembled, to observe a temporising policy, encouraging
attendance and requiring an explanation of past conduct, but neither
announcing terms nor making any definite communication. Recognising also
that the greater danger was now threatening from the Khyber, the larger
part of the force present under General Willcocks at Shabkadar and
Peshawar was drawn to the pass.
The Reserve Brigade, under General Ramsay, reached Lundi Kotal on the
3rd May, while that under General Barrett marched to Ali Musjid; General
Anderson remained at Shabkadar with his brigade in observation of the
Mohmands.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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