The plan was to cross the Ublan Pass, and if not opposed at the village of Gara to pass on to and destroy that of Dana Khula; if, however, opposed at Gara, then no further advance was to be made, as the delay would preclude the surprise of Dana Khula, where the enemy would be able to make preparations, while to reach it the troops would have to fight their way for two miles. The jirgah of the Kohat Pass Afridis happened then to be in Kohat, and to prevent any information leaking out through them to the Daulatzais, the jirgah was detained in Kohat on some pretext while the troops were absent. It was clear that the complete success of the whole operation depended upon the sudden and surprise seizure of the Ublan Kotal, and, consequently, not even commanding officers were informed of what was in view until a few hours prior to a start being made. At midnight on the 24th February, the 4th Punjab Cavalry[130] moved out and formed a complete cordon round the town of Kohat, so as to prevent anybody from entering, and, still more, from leaving it; police picquets were posted also at all places where a footman might seek to enter the hills. At the same hour the mountain guns were got ready for service, half an hour later the native gunners were warned, and the 1st and 4th Punjab Infantry were turned out; at 1 a.m. the 2nd Punjab Infantry was paraded, and at that hour two guns and two infantry battalions left Kohat; all without bugle sound. The Kotal was found undefended, but the enemy made some stand at Gara, which was taken with a loss on our side of one killed and nineteen wounded, and the surprise of Dana Khula was consequently impracticable. Gara, however, was completely destroyed, cattle and other live stock were driven off, and the retirement commenced. The descent was steep and difficult, and the retreat, harassed by the enemy, was necessarily slow, but the troops were withdrawn from the hill with great coolness and steadiness, incurring, however, a further loss of two killed and fourteen wounded. [Sidenote: Continued Trouble] While these operations were being carried on from Kohat, a strong column had moved out from Peshawar, and had materially assisted the movements of Colonel Keyes’ force by distracting the attention of the Utman Khel Orakzais and a division of the Aka Khel Afridis. The Bizotis and their neighbours had learnt a lesson, and early in April the jirgahs of the Bizotis, Utman Khels and Sipaia (Muhammad Khel) divisions came into Kohat, made submission, paid a fine of Rs. 1200, and gave up nine of their principal headmen as hostages for their future good behaviour; the long-standing blockade was then removed.