Notwithstanding these losses in the valley the Russians were secure on the ridge about the temple, and there appeared no reason why they should not remain there until turned out by the bayonet. Their right was pushed well forward in trench and wood, from which the Japanese advance could be enfiladed and taken in the rear; their left was strongly posted in a trench commanding the steep decline down which the Japanese must come from the right, and their centre had the shelter of the solidly built temple, with a compound surrounded by a high stone wall. Any attempt on the part of the Japanese to rush the position must have been attended with great loss, and might easily have proved disastrous. That General Nishi fully realised the danger was shown by the rapidity with which the reinforcements were hurried forward. At nine o’clock the enemy began to retire. The cause of this unexpected determination to abandon an obvious advantage was obscure. It might have been due to the action of a reconnoitring party from the division on our left. At any rate the story was that on the morning of the 17th a patrol from our left encountered a body of Russians, and was driven back. Returning with one battalion and a battery they renewed the combat and put the Russians to flight. Not content with this success, the commander of the force resolved to push forward in the direction of Mou-tien-ling, whence he heard heavy firing. Having faith in the old maxim of “marching to the cannon,” he abandoned the road, led his battalion over the mountains and suddenly appeared in the rear of the Russians, about three miles beyond To-wan. General Keller, who was in command, may have imagined that this was a counter attack on his right flank, and that his line of retreat was seriously menaced. Whatever the cause the result was before us when we arrived at Mou-tien-ling.