The news was startling, for it had long been known that the Russians had made defensive works at Anshantien, where they were expected to offer a stubborn resistance. That they should abandon this strong position without a struggle was proof that the First Army had done its work well, and had inspired the enemy with fear lest Anshantien might be turned. The situation called for prompt and energetic action. If the Russians had made up their minds to evacuate Liao-yang and to fall back upon Mukden without striking a blow there was imminent risk that all our schemes and sacrifices of the last three months would come to naught and that our prey would escape the net spread for him. Liao-yang without Russian guns and captives would be a poor reward at the end of five months’ successful campaigning. Two alternatives presented themselves. By overtaking the enemy we might compel him to accept battle at Liao-yang, or we might engage him in a rear guard action and detach a strong force to cross the Tai-tsu and strike North at his communications. The position demanded a General of daring and resource. Having withdrawn to their entrenched line at Shou-shan the Russians were content with holding the defences North of the Tang-ho only long enough to ensure the orderly retirement of their forces in the neighbourhood of Am-ping. General Kuroki gave instant orders for the occupation of the line from the North-east of Sobyoshi to Kosanshi through Daisekimon. This advance met with feeble opposition. Our work on the 28th of August was comparatively easy. We were in possession of the South bank of the river, with our centre a little way to the West of Am-ping, and our left wing established across the Pekin road.