The fighting, which begun at ten o’clock on the morning of September 2nd, was confined to the trenches and the railway embankment, which served as a permanent breastwork. From the railway station the Russians opposed the advance with heavy guns, and from the North bank of the river many batteries opened a furious cannonade. Though the enemy held stubbornly to this last line of defence, it was manifest that they were now fighting only a rear guard action to cover the retreat of their army. Their orders were to hold the position at all costs and they obeyed. Before dawn next morning, Captain Inouye, of the Engineers, who blew up the Southern gate at Tientsin in the Boxer expedition, passed through the enemy’s lines and reached the Southern gate of the city. His instructions were to destroy the gate, but finding it open he exploded his charge of dynamite near a temple. This was the signal for the final assault. The main army of General Kuropatkin was already on its way to Mukden. Over the many bridges thrown across the river had passed guns and equipment and stores. What remained was of little consequence and was now committed to the flames. Several huge sheds stocked with flour and wheat and oats began to blaze and unmistakable proof was given that Liao-yang had been abandoned. But it was still necessary to gain time in order to avoid pursuit. A strong rearguard continued to hold the trenches in front of the city. Against these our infantry advanced early on the 3rd of September. With heavy loss they came to within three hundred yards of the trenches. One or two battalions moved closer, but could make no impression. One method alone promised success and from that the Japanese, with their inherited love of the _arme blanche_, never shrink. The order was to fix bayonets and charge. Up sprang the fighting line with a shout that must have quickened the steps of laggards on the bridges and with a mighty rush the last trench was carried. Again our casualties were many, but the road to Liao-yang was open at last. Rapidly and in good order the Russians retired across the river, destroying the bridges, burning their pontoon train and the woodwork of the railway bridge. Next morning we entered Liao-yang and found to our keen disappointment that it was not a Sedan. Historians who are prophets after the event, will doubtless prove to their own satisfaction that General Kuropatkin’s retreat was in conformity with a premeditated plan to entice the Japanese into the heart of Manchuria; that from the first it was his design to avoid a decisive battle at Liao-yang, and that the losses sustained by his army were the natural results of a rearguard action. In this theory they may find support among Japanese Staff Officers who become suddenly anxious to explain the failure of their Sedan by affirming that as early as the evening of August 30th, they discovered indications of General Kuropatkin’s intention to evacuate Liao-yang. To penetrate the designs of the