It is a remarkable feature of the war--the complete breakdown of the Russian Intelligence branch. From the first they grossly and even ludicrously exaggerated the forces opposed to them. General Kuroki’s army was magnified twofold. General Keller reported that at Mou-tien-ling he was repulsed by a greatly superior force, whereas he was driven back by four companies of infantry! On another occasion a whole division was checked by a single battalion whose commander adopted the simple and familiar ruse of posting his men in small groups over a wide front. The truth is that the army was too small to risk vigorous and prolonged pursuit or to make those extended flanking movements that were so successful before the concentration of the Russian forces and the abandonment of attempts to relieve Port Arthur. Some critics have sought to prove that the Japanese kept Port Arthur as a bait to lure the enemy South and that the prolonged resistance of General Stoessel was of the highest service to Marshal Oyama. Nothing could be further from the fact. The Japanese considered the fall of Port Arthur essential to their command of the sea: it was urgently needed also as the only port free from ice in the Winter. Yet had they realised for a moment that General Stoessel could hold out after the first week of August they would have contented themselves with an investment. That, at any rate, is the deliberate statement of men responsible for the conduct of the campaign. And they had reason, for Port Arthur not merely retarded progress in Manchuria but twice robbed the Japanese of the fruits of hard won victory. From a hill, near the village of Sha-ho, I saw Mukden on the morning of October the 16th. In the grey distance, across the plain which autumn had tinted with purple and brown, rose wall and towers--a vague shadow that melted into mist, like a city of dreamland. Away to the West among the pine groves thundered the guns of the Western army, and in the little hamlet at my feet was assembled the detachment that was to try its luck on the other side of the river and to meet with the first reverse to the Japanese arms. In the hope of striking the enemy from the rear and compelling them to abandon their first line of defence, the detachment, under General Yamada, crossed the Sha-ho, captured two guns, and seemed on the point of accomplishing its purpose when a division of the Russians came down from the North-east and simultaneously an attack was delivered from the West. Surrounded on both flanks the regiment cut its way back, but left behind nine field and five mountain guns--the first guns lost by the Japanese. [Illustration: Foreign Attachés and Correspondents.]