Lüshun (China) -- History -- Siege, 1904-1905; Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Were the defences so weak as to lay the fortress open to capture by
assault? General Reiss, Chief of the Staff, and, probably, General
Stoessel himself, held that opinion, and sought to avert the horrors
of a citadel taken by storm. The situation at the moment of surrender
may be briefly described. On the morning of December 31st the Japanese
destroyed Sungshushan at the Western extremity of the Eastern fort
ridge--the centre of the main line of defensive works. Sungshushan
occupied a strong natural position, though it was under fire from the
supporting fort and could be enfiladed from Idjesham--also a strong
fort--and from Antzushan, a battery position, across the gorge of
Suishiyei valley. These three positions remained to the last in the
hands of the Russians. Late in the afternoon of the 31st the Japanese
advanced from Sungshushan and seized the battery position, known as
Eboshiyama, to the rear of the fort. At the same time the 9th Division
made an assault on the Chinese wall, breached it near East Panlung,
and, pouring through the gap, drove the enemy along the trenches to the
neck between H. fort and Bodai, or Wantai. Before midnight General Nogi
was in possession of all the higher hills of the fort ridge from East
Panlung Westward to Sungshushan, except the supporting fort. On the
first day of the new year the assaulting force was under the battery
position of Bodai--a lofty height on the narrow peak of which were
posted two six-inch guns. Again and again this hill was stormed, and
was finally carried with a brilliant rush.
From Bodai the Japanese looked down over the second line of defences
into the heart of the city. During the night of January 1st--after
negotiations for the capitulation had begun--when the Russians were
busy exploding their battle ships with torpedoes and sinking small
vessels at the entrance to the harbour, the Japanese advanced from
Bodai to the back of East Keekwan. At two o’clock next morning the
enemy blew up several mines in the concrete foundations of that fort
and reduced it to a heap of _débris_. At dawn of the day on which
the capitulation was signed the Japanese held the Western half of the
Eastern fort ridge from East Keekwan to Sungshushan, and were firmly
established along the centre of the main line of defensive works.
The second line of defence has been described as “strong”--a term
that can hardly be applied to a line of entrenched hills dominated by
the fort ridge in possession of an enemy. The fact is that experience
revealed serious defects in the natural strength of Port Arthur. In
some respects the Russian line was admirable for defence. It had a
clear field of fire, excellent observation points, and commanded mutual
support among the forts. But it had one grave and incurable defect. The
line of forts was too near to the city, so that magazines, workshops,
supply depôts, and barracks were under constant fire from the line of
hills parallel to, and only four thousand yards from, the forts.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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