If they have even a trifling success they will strive to take the utmost advantage of it. We have to remember always that they must be beaten at the outset, however slight may be our victory. Their outposts are usually stationed at a considerable distance from the main body, especially when they occupy a defensive position. Their infantry often charge with the bayonet--but they have little skill in the use of the bayonet, and none at all in individual encounter. Their infantry is not clever in making use of natural objects for cover, and fights awkwardly in uneven and mountainous country, though on the plain it is very clever. Russian cavalry and sometimes infantry when retreating set fire to the villages, so that we cannot expect to find shelter and supplies in places they have evacuated. The Cossacks often attack transport trains and lines of communication, and it is always necessary to keep close watch on both flanks. If once successful in these attacks they will make many attempts. The Cossacks made no heroic movement in the war of 1877, and their reports were always exaggerated. They invariably retire when met by a stronger force. If our infantry is a little careful we need have no fear of the Cossacks. A Russian battery consists of eight guns; they have few mountain guns. In the war of 1877 their artillery was not able to accomplish much. When at war with the Turks their higher officers were jealous of each other’s success and fame; often they could not agree upon strategic plans, and were accordingly unable to make simultaneous movements of many divisions under one command. Notwithstanding that the Russians had a greater force of cavalry than the Turks they could not prevent the enemy from bringing supplies into Plevna. Amid the snows of Shipka Pass the infantry suffered terrible hardships and yet made a terrific assault, but this was because the defeat of the Turks was no longer in question. The Russians sometimes try to carry out the wildest plans; and we must neglect no point however impossible of approach it may appear. In 1877 the men endured hardships well; the officers did not. So changeable are the feelings of the Russians that though at one moment they may be in the depths of despair, a trifling success will make them bold again and remove all fear of their enemy. In the war with the Turks there were many mean-minded Russian officers who placed their personal interest and comfort beyond every other consideration. The Russians often endeavour to draw their enemy to a short distance, and then open a terrible fire of rifles and artillery. In occupying a position they pay little attention to their communications.”