The Japanese have been blamed for not taking advantage of their victory at the Yalu to press North without delay. There were many reasons for hesitation. In the first place they did not know the strength of the enemy, and feared that General Kuropatkin might descend upon them with overwhelming force. Between the Yalu and Feng-hoang-cheng were several strong positions, where the Russians might have made a stand. General Kuroki accordingly determined to seize the heights about Hamatan, and to await developments. Cavalry patrols were pushed forward, and sent back word that the enemy had evacuated Feng-hoang-cheng. These reports were hardly credited, for Feng-hoang-cheng was a point of great strategic importance--the junction of many roads--where it was expected that the Russians would offer strenuous resistance. General Kuroki advanced upon Feng-hoang-cheng with the utmost caution, separating his army into three columns so as to guard against surprise. He was by no means certain that with the force under his command it would be prudent to remain at Feng-hoang-cheng. The landing of a small part of the Second Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula on May 5th introduced a new factor into the calculations. It was known that a large force of Russians confronted General Oku at Kin-chow, and there was danger that they would be content with holding him while the main army struck at General Kuroki. This was a movement greatly feared by the Japanese and had a powerful influence upon their plans. General Kuroki was of opinion that for three or four months he must be prepared to encounter an enemy twice as numerous as his own army. He had, however, the satisfaction of knowing that if the Russians came upon him in force, the landing of the Second Army would be assured. Accordingly he no sooner entered Feng-hoang-cheng than he proceeded to fortify the surrounding hills. Though the position was strong for defence, the perimeter was too extended for the force at his disposal, and orders were given that in the event of attack the Japanese were to leave the position and meet the enemy in front. The Twelfth Division was posted on the East, the Second Division on the West, and the Guard’s Division in the centre on the Pekin road.