Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
We do not advance this proposition without a solid reason. It is
probable, and even very probable, that our soul has active faculties,
of the exercise of which it is not conscious; otherwise how explain
the mysteries of organic life? The soul is united to the body, and is
for it the vital principle, the separation from which causes death,
manifested in complete disorganization and decomposition. This activity
is exercised without consciousness, either of the mode or of the fact
of its existence.
It may be said that there is here a series of those confused
perceptions of which Leibnitz speaks in his _Monadologie_; or that
these perceptions are so slight, so wan, as to leave no trace in the
memory, nor be an object of reflection: but these are only conjectures.
It is hard to persuade one's self that the fœtus in the mother's womb
has any consciousness of the activity exercised for the development of
its organization: it is also hard to persuade one's self that even
in adults there is any consciousness of that same activity producing
circulation of the blood, nutrition, and other phenomena which
constitute life. If these phenomena are produced, as they certainly
are, by the soul, there is in it, an exercise of activity of which it
either has no consciousness, or one so weak and confused that it is as
if it were not.
THIRD PROPOSITION.
237. The testimony of consciousness, in itself considered, is so
limited to the purely internal, that it is _of itself_ worth nothing in
the external order, either for the criterion of evidence or that of the
senses.
FOURTH PROPOSITION.
The testimony of consciousness is the foundation of the other criteria,
inasmuch as it is a fact which they all require, and without which they
are impossible.
FIFTH PROPOSITION.
238. From the combination of consciousness with intellectual instinct
arise all the other criteria.(23)
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE CRITERION OF EVIDENCE.
239. There are two species of evidence, mediate and immediate. We
call immediate evidence that which requires only understanding of the
terms; and mediate evidence that which requires reasoning. That the
whole is greater than its part is evident by immediate evidence;
that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares
of the other two sides, is known by mediate evidence, that is, by
demonstrative reasoning.
240. We have said that one of the distinctive characteristics of
evidence is the necessity and universality of its object. This is a
characteristic as well of mediate as of immediate evidence.
Besides this characteristic there is another, called with more reason
essential, notwithstanding some doubt as to whether it extends to
mediate evidence or not; it is that the idea of the predicate is
found contained in that of the subject. This is the most complete
essential notion of the criterion of immediate evidence, by which it is
distinguished from the criteria of consciousness and common sense.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account