262. In their arguments against objective certainty, its opponents are accustomed to depend upon the errors into which it leads us. The madman believes he sees objects, which do not exist; the lunatic believes firmly in his disconnected thoughts; and why may not that which deceives us in one instance, also deceive us in another, and all cases? Can that be a certain criterion which sometimes fails? Why not stop with the purely subjective? The madman, the lunatic, are deceived in the object, not in the subject; although what they think is not true, it is still very true and certain that they think it. This is a specious objection; but it does not remove the difficulties under which the system, in favor of which it is adduced, labors; and it may, on the other hand, be solved in so far as it tends to weaken objective truth. The madman, the lunatic, have also recollections of things that never existed. These recollections do not relate solely to external, but likewise to their internal acts. The madman who calls himself king, acts in accordance with his thought, with what he felt when crowned, when dethroned; and yet, these intellectual phenomena never existed. And, however this may be, he himself may have produced these recollections. We hold, then, that the criterion with respect to memory is wrong in this case, and can be of avail in no case. Therefore, even, although we had not shown that without objective truth there is no recollection even of the internal, the arguments of our adversaries would have sufficed. This objection, if it prove any thing, confirms all that we have advanced in demonstrating that without objectiveness there is no consciousness properly so called, and this even our opponents do not admit. 263. Moreover, we at once see what weight an argument based on craziness should have at the tribunal of reason. It all, at the most, only proves the weakness of our nature, that in some unfortunate individuals the established order of humanity is reversed; that the rule of truth, as it exists in so weak a creature, admits of some exceptions; but these exceptions are known, for their characters are marked. The exception does not destroy, it only confirms the rule.(25) CHAPTER XXVI. CAN ALL COGNITIONS BE REDUCED TO THE PERCEPTION OF IDENTITY?