Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
3. However developed and perfected we suppose sensibility, it falls far
short of intelligence, from which it must ever remain separated, as
from a faculty of a different order. Though we suppose the sensitive
faculties capable of indefinite perfectibility, they can never reach
the sphere of intelligence, properly so called. This perfectibility
would lie in a different order, eternally distinct from that of
intellectual beings. If we suppose a color infinitely perfected, it
will never become a sound, a sound a taste, a taste a sound, nor a
sound a color; because perfectibility is confined to its own order.
Therefore, however it may be perfected, sensibility can never become
intelligence.
This observation will serve to guard against one of the most fatal
errors of our age, which consists in regarding the universe as the
result of a mysterious force, which, developing itself by a continual
movement, at once spontaneous and necessary, goes on giving birth
to beings and elevating species by a perpetual transformation. Thus
the greater perfection of the vegetable organization would produce
the animal faculties; these being perfected would become sensitive,
and in measure as they progressed in the order of sensation they
would approach the realm of intelligence, and would finally attain
it. There is not a little analogy between this system and that which
makes thought a transformed sensation; it effaces the dividing line
between intelligent and non-intelligent beings; the sensations of an
oyster may, according to it, be so perfected as to be converted into
an intelligence superior to that of Bossuet or of Leibnitz; and the
development of the faculties of the man-statue would be an emblem of
the development of the universe.
4. It may have been already remarked that we are now speaking of the
sensitive faculty in itself considered, abstracting from its relations
to external objects; and that we therefore comprehend in the word
_sensation_, all affections of the senses, whether actually produced,
recollected, or imagined; that is, all affections in all degrees from
the first direct consciousness of them, or when they are presented to
the being which experiences them, until they reach the limit where
intelligence, strictly so called, commences.
It is impossible here to draw the dividing line between the sensible
and the intelligible; this requires profound and extensive studies upon
sensations compared with ideas, which does not belong to this place:
but it will be well to have pointed out the existence of this line, in
order to avoid confusion in a most subtle matter, in which every error
is attended with the most serious consequences.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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