8. The idea of the _me_ is in some sense applicable to every sensitive being; for sensation is inconceivable without a _permanent_ being, which experiences what is _transitory_; that is, without a being which is _one_ in the midst of _multiplicity_. Every sensible being, were it capable of reflection, might, in its own way, say _I_; for it is true of all of them that it is _one same_ being that experiences the _variety_ of sensations. Without this bond, this unity, there is no _one_ sensible being, but a _succession_ of sensations as unconnected phenomena of the whole. 9. There is no sensation without direct consciousness; for, as this is nothing but the very presence of the phenomenon to the being experiencing it, it would be contradictory to say that it feels without consciousness. A sensation experienced, is a sensation present; a sensation not present, that is, not experienced, is inconceivable, is an absurdity.[35] [35] See Bk. II., Ch. XXIII., § 226. 10. Every sensation involves presence, or direct consciousness, but not representation. I think this distinction important. The sensations of smell, taste, and hearing, are not representative; they remain in themselves, and in their object. The being experiencing them might believe himself enclosed in himself, in an absolute solitude, with no relation to other beings; but touch, and, above all, sight, are by their nature representative; they involve relation to objects; and they imply relation to other beings, not as to mere _causes_ of the internal affection, but as the _originals_ represented in the sensation. The class of sensible beings endowed with the faculty of representation seems to be of an order very superior to the others; these beings not only have consciousness, but also a mysterious power whereby they see within themselves an entire world. 11. What is the most perfect degree of sensitive life? What the most imperfect? These questions we cannot answer, for we cannot judge of these things otherwise than by experience and analogy. But viewing the immensity of the scale, experience shows us we may infer that nature is far richer than we imagine. Let us not disturb its profound secrets, but be content to suspect that they exist. CHAPTER II. MATTER IS INCAPABLE OF SENSATION. 12. The phenomenon of sensibility reveals to us the existence of an order of beings distinct from matter. However perfect we may suppose material organization, it cannot rise to sensation; matter is wholly incapable of sensation; and the absurd system of materialism can neither explain the phenomena of intelligence, nor even of sensation.