Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
31. Hence we conclude: First, that our sensations considered as purely
internal phenomena, are divided into two very different classes; some
depend upon our will, others do not; some have no mutual connection, or
are variable in their relations, at the pleasure of him who experiences
them; others have a certain connection which we can neither change
nor destroy. Secondly, we conclude that the existence as well as the
modifications of this last class, proceeds from causes not ourselves,
independent of our will, and outside of us. That instinct, therefore,
which impels us to refer these sensations to external objects, is
confirmed by reason: therefore the testimony of the senses, in so
far as it assures us of the reality of objects, is admissible at the
tribunal of philosophy.
This demonstrates, in a certain manner, the existence of bodies; for we
find, in philosophically examining the conception of body, something in
it distinct from our own being, the presence of which causes us such
and such sensations. We know not the intimate essence of bodies; but
even if we did know it, it would not aid our present purpose, for we
are not treating of the idea which a philosopher would in such a case
form, but of that formed by the generality of men.
CHAPTER VI.
IS THE EXTERNAL AND IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF SENSATIONS A FREE CAUSE?
32. A difficulty, at first sight serious, but in reality futile, may be
brought against the existence of bodies. Who knows, it may be asked,
but what some cause, not at all resembling the idea which we form of
bodies, produces in us all the phenomena that we experience? God may,
if he pleases, cause one or many sensations in us; and who shall assure
us that he does not? Who shall assure us that other beings may not do
the same, and so all our imaginations of a corporeal world be a pure
illusion?
33. The first and simplest solution that can be given is, that God,
being infinitely true, can neither deceive us himself, nor allow other
creatures to deceive us constantly and in a way that we cannot resist.
But this solution although well founded, just, and reasonable, labors
under the inconvenience of establishing the physical by recurring to
the moral order; and so it would never satisfy those who desire to see
the truth of the testimony of the senses demonstrated by arguments
drawn from the nature of things. Such arguments we think we can supply.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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