Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
This difficulty did not altogether escape Condillac; for after having
asked if the _me_ of the statue, when modified by a blue surface,
bordered with white, would not believe itself a limited blue color,
he says: "At first sight we were inclined to believe that it would;
but the contrary opinion is much more probable." But why? "The statue
cannot perceive itself extended by this surface, save inasmuch as
each part modifies it in the same way; each part should produce
the sensation of blue color; but if it is alike modified by a foot
of this surface and by an inch, it cannot perceive itself, in this
modification, to be one magnitude rather than another. Therefore it
does not perceive itself as magnitude; therefore the sensation of
color does not involve the idea of extension." It is easy to see that
Condillac either supposes what is in debate, or else says nothing to
the point. According to him, the statue is alike modified by a foot
of colored surface and by an inch. If by this he means that the two
modifications are identical under all aspects, he supposes the very
thing he ought to have proved; for this is precisely the point in
dispute, whether surfaces differing in magnitude do, or do not, produce
different sensations. If he means, as his words seem to indicate, that
the sensation as color, and solely as color, is the same in a foot of
colored surface as in an inch, he utters, indeed, an incontestable
truth, but one not at all to his purpose. Undoubtedly, the sensation
of blue, as blue, is the same in different magnitudes, and no one ever
thought of denying it. But this is not the question: it is whether, the
color remaining one and the same, the sensation of sight is modified
differently, according to the variety of magnitude of the colored
surface. Condillac denies it, but in an uncertain and hesitating way.
We believe his negation to be so groundless that the direct contrary
may be proved.
69. I would ask Condillac if he can have color without surface; if an
object without extension can be painted upon the retina; if we can even
conceive a color without extension. No one of these is possible, sight
is therefore necessarily accompanied by extension.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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