Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
What is sensation? In the ordinary acceptation of the word, it is the
perception of the impression transmitted to us by one of the organs of
the five senses. Thus understood it is clearly limited to the action
of the organs, but if considered as expressing a certain class of
animal phenomena, it is the experiencing of any affection produced by
an impression of the organism. Even in common use the word sensation
in its broadest signification is not restricted to the impressions
of the five senses, and although we make a great difference between
_sentiment_ and _sensation_; still we are often forced to confound
them, and to use the word _sensation_ to express things which have
nothing whatever to do with the five senses. Thus we say: "The news
made a great sensation;" "I cannot resist the force of such strong
sensations," etc., in which cases it is evident that there is no
reference to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching, but to a
different order of affections of the soul.
99. I said we were forced to use the word in the broader meaning;
it is the truth which forces us. For, to the eyes of philosophy,
the phenomenon of sensation consists in the production in the soul
of a particular affection determined by an impression on an organ;
and of whatever order this affection may be, and whatever organ may
be affected, the animal phenomenon is substantially the same. The
difference is in the class of affections and of the organ which is
their medium, the essence of the phenomenon does not change. And if by
sensations we understand such distinct orders of affections as those of
sight and of touch, why may we not include other impressions caused by
any other organ, whatever that organ may be?
100. Whatever use we may make of the word sensation, it is certain that
we experience many affections caused by organic impressions, besides
those of the five senses. What are passions but affections of the soul,
springing from organic impressions? Does not the mere presence of an
object often excite love, anger, pity, joy, grief, and many other
sentiments of the soul?
You may say there is an essential difference between the impressions of
the senses and those of the passions, that the former are independent
of all previous idea and reflection, which the latter more or less
presuppose. Thus, when an object is present to our open eyes, we
cannot but see it and always in the same manner; and yet this object
will excite in us at one time one passion, at another time another, and
sometimes none; and almost always with great difference in the degree
of its intensity. Moreover it is not only the mere presence of the
object which causes an affection, but certain conditions are necessary,
for example; the remembrance of a benefit or of an injury, etc., from
which it is easy to see that there is an essential difference between
the two classes of impressions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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