Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
This difficulty, which seems so serious at first, immediately vanishes
if we deny that every extended thing needs a place in which it may be
situated. What is this place? It is an extension in which the thing
may be contained. Does this extension also require another extension
in which it may be placed, or does it not? If it does, then the same
question may be asked of this new place in which the other place is
contained, and so on _ad infinitum_. This is evidently impossible, and
therefore we must admit that it is false that all extension requires
another extension in which it may be placed. Just as the extension of
space does not require another extension, so the extension of bodies
does not require space. There is no disparity between the two cases.
Therefore the necessity of a place for every extension is merely
imaginary, and is opposed to reason. Extension, therefore, may exist in
itself, and there is no reason why the extension of bodies may not also
exist in this manner.
85. What in this case would be the meaning of changing place? It would
simply mean that bodies change their respective position. This is the
explanation of motion.
Suppose three bodies, A, B, and C, to be situated in space. Their
respective distances are the bodies which are interposed between them.
The change which a new position causes, is motion.
86. Therefore, if there were only one body there could be no motion.
For motion is necessarily the passing over a distance, and, there is no
distance when there is only one body.
This seems at first absurd, because it is opposed to our way of
thinking and imagining; but if we carefully examine this way of
thinking and imagining, we shall see that the phenomena of our mind are
in accordance with this theory.
Motion has no meaning for us, we do not feel or perceive it, when we
cannot refer it to the position of different bodies among themselves.
If we sail down a river, shut up in the cabin of the vessel which bears
us on, we really move, though we have no perception of this motion.
We know that we move when watching the objects on the shore, we see
that they are continually changing. Even then, the motion seems to be
in the objects around us, not in ourselves, and the phenomena would
be absolutely the same with respect to us, if, instead of the objects
being at rest, and the vessel in motion, the vessel should be at rest
and the objects in motion, supposing the motion of the objects to be
properly combined.[47]
[47] See Book II., Chap. xv.
Therefore, take away the agitation, which is all that informs us of
our own motion, and we are unable to distinguish whether the motion is
in us or in the objects; and we are naturally more inclined to refer
the motion to them than to ourselves. When the vessel that carries us
leaves the port, we know very well that it is not the port which moves,
and yet the illusion is complete, the port seems to retire from us.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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